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IN MEMORIAL 
 
On July 7, 2006 Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police Constable 
Robin Cameron and Constable 
Marc Bourdages had 
responded to an assault call in 
Spiritwood, Saskatchewan and 
were shot in a gun battle after a 27 km. chase. 
The constables had been in critical condition in a 
Saskatoon hospital since the shooting, which 
occurred near the farming community of 
Mildred, about 140 kms. from Prince Albert. 
 
The suspect fled on foot after the shooting and 
has since turned himself in. He had been the 
subject of a massive manhunt after the 
constables were shot. The suspect’s father has 
been charged with obstructing justice for 
defying a police order to stay away from a 
restricted police search area, where the RCMP 
believed his son was hiding. The suspect faces 
two charges of first degree murder and a charge 
of attempted murder of a third officer who had 
joined the chase, but was not injured. 
 
Both constables succumbed to their injuries 
within two hours of each other. 
 
Constable Cameron had 
served with the RCMP for 
5 years and was posted to 
Spiritwood Detachment, F 
Division. She is survived 
by her 11-year-old 
daughter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constable Bourdages had 
served with the RCMP for 
5 ½ years and was posted 
to Spiritwood Detachment, 
F Division. He is survived 
by his wife, also a 
constable with the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, 
and his 9-month-old son. 
 
With the deaths of Constable Cameron and 
Constable Bourdages, a total of 15 peace 
officers have lost their lives to gunfire over the 
past 10 years. Other officers killed by gunfire 
include: 
 
2006 Constable John Atkinson 
  
2005 Constable Peter Schiemann 
 Constable Anthony Gordon 
 Constable Lionide Johnston 
 Constable Brock Myrol 
Constable Valerie Gignac 
 
2004 Corporal James Galloway 
 
2002 Constable Benoit L’Ecuyer 
 
2001 Constable Jurgen Seewald 
 Constable Dennis Strongquill 
 
1997 Senior Constable Thomas Coffin 
  Corrections Officer Dianne Lavigne 
  Corrections Officer Pierre Rondeau 
 
“They are our heroes, 
We shall not forget them”1 
 
The preceding information was provided with the 
permission of the Officer Down Memorial Page: 
available at www.odmp.org/Canada 
                                                 
1 Inscription on Canadian Police and Peace Officer Memorial—Parliament Buildings 
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 ‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
“I am a Police Officer…in 
Ontario. I am a member of 
our Training Bureau and was 
wondering if you could add 
me onto your list for future 
10-8 newsletters. I find them extremely 
beneficial and insightful.   Thanks loads.”—Police 
Constable, Ontario 
************ 
“I appreciated the use of clear and plain 
language in explaining court cases in your 
publication.”—Crown Prosecutor, British 
Columbia 
************ 
“Thanks for the new issue. It’s always a good 
read.”—Police Constable, British Columbia 
************ 
”We really enjoy 10-8 and find it very useful 
[and would] hate to miss an edition of it.”—Police 
Inspector, Ontario 
************ 
“I am still reading your newsletter. It is an 
excellent “just in time, just the basics” 
production”—Crown Prosecutor, British 
Columbia 
************ 
“I am a Police Officer in Ontario…and, even 
after 19 years in Policing, find your articles to be 
a learning experience.”—Police Constable, 
Ontario 
************ 
“I have been with the RCMP in this province for 
30 years and…one of our…members brought the 
In-Service 10-8, Volume 5 Issue 4, into our 
office for reading. I have never seen this 
publication before and I noted several very 
informative cases and would ask that you place 
me on your electronic distribution list so that I 
can share Service 10-8 with the other members 
of our unit.”—Corporal, RCMP British Columbia 
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“Great work!”—Police Constable, RCMP British 
Columbia 
************ 
“I would appreciate being added to your 
distribution list for your publication "In Service: 
10-8". I am a supervising Fishery Officer with 
responsibilities for the Yukon and north western 
portion of BC and am greatly interested in 
keeping abreast of ever changing case law. Thank 
you very much for your publication.”—Acting 
Area Chief, Fisheries & Oceans Canada 
************ 
“The edition of your latest newsletter…was just 
forwarded to me… I found the information well 
put together and easy to read. Great job!”—
Police Sergeant, Alberta 
************ 
“I’m a Sergeant…and read your newsletter.  It 
was extremely informative and would like to be 
on your mailing list.”—Police Sergeant, Alberta 
************ 
“We recently had a new member posted in from 
the island. Along with him, he introduced our 
section to your newsletter. Normally, our outside 
link to the Law Enforcement world is the "Blue 
Line” magazine. Your newsletter was a 
refresher.  I found a number of your articles 
very informative and valuable training aids. I look 
forward to future articles.”—Master Corporal, 
Military Police 
************ 
“I'm fresh out of the JI Police Academy, and…I 
think your online magazine is great for keeping 
us up to speed with any new changes and new 
case law.”—Police Constable, British Columbia 
************ 
“Thanks for your 10-8 Newsletter.  It's an 
excellent publication.”—Police Officer, Ontario 
 
All past editions of this 
newsletter are available online by 
logging on to:  
www.10-8.ca 
‘IN SERVICE’ LEGAL ROAD      
TEST 
 
How much do you 
know about Canada’s 
top court, the 
Supreme Court of 
Canada? See page 14 for the answers. 
 
1. In what year was the Supreme Court created? 
(a) 1867 
(b) 1875 
(c) 1924 
(d) 1949  
 
2. How many judges are on the Supreme Court? 
 (a) 5 
 (b) 7 
 (c) 9 
 (d) 11 
 
3. Who was the first woman to be appointed to 
the Supreme Court? 
(a) Bertha Wilson  
(b) Claire L’Heureux-Dube  
(c) Beverly McLachlin 
(d) Louise Charron 
 
4. Approximately how many appeals does the 
Supreme Court hear each year?  
(a) 320 
(b) 240 
(c) 160 
(d) 80 
 
5. What colour of robes do the Supreme Court 
judges wear during hearings? 
(a) red 
(b) blue 
(c) black 
 
6. What is the minimum number of Supreme 
Court judges required to hear an appeal? 
 (a) 3 
 (b) 5 
 (c) 7 
 (d) 9 
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SECOND SEARCH WARRANT 
APPLICATION OK 
R. v. Duchcherer & R. v. Oakes,  
2006 BCCA 171 
 
A police officer applied for a 
tele-warrant by fax under s.11 
of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA) to 
search a residence, but it was 
rejected by a Judicial Justice of the Peace 
(JJP). The JJP informed the officer of her 
reasons for rejecting the warrant and noted he 
could “re-apply with more info.” The officer then 
added three more paragraphs to the information 
explaining the JJP’s reasons for rejecting the 
warrant and arguing why these reasons were not 
proper to reject the application. The officer 
then applied to a British Columbia Provincial 
Court judge who authorized the search warrant.  
 
A search was carried out and 150 marihuana 
plants were found hidden behind plywood 
barriers and the equipment used was indicative 
of a commercial operation. Both accused were 
arrested and charged with unlawfully producing a 
controlled substance. During a voir dire in British 
Columbia Provincial Court the trial judge 
concluded the search was warrantless and the 
evidence ought to be excluded under s.24(2) of 
the Charter. In his view, the JJP rejected the 
warrant for substantive reasons (the grounds 
were insufficient) and no new information was 
added when the officer re-applied for the 
warrant. Had new information been added, a 
different judge could have heard the application 
de novo (a new or fresh). However, since there 
was no new information, the officer was seeking 
a review of the JJP’s earlier decision, something 
for which no statutory authority existed. 
Therefore, the judge hearing the second 
application exceeded his jurisdiction. The 
Provincial Court Judge wrote: 
 
In my view, [the officer] had two options. He 
could have obtained more and better 
information and re-submitted the ITO to a 
JJP or Judge. Alternatively, he could have 
sought judicial review in the Supreme Court. 
He chose neither option and, for these 
reasons, the search warrant is invalid and a 
nullity. The ensuing search of the residence 
was, therefore, a warrantless one and in the 
result the Accused persons' rights against 
unreasonable search and seizure in section 8 
of the Charter were breached. [para. 42, 2004 
BCPC 547]  
 
The evidence was excluded and the accused were 
acquitted. 
 
The Crown then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing the trial judge erred. 
The accused, on the other hand, contended that 
once a search warrant has been rejected any new 
application without new information is a review 
or appeal of the earlier application and there is 
no authority allowing for a re-hearing by another 
justice (or judge).  
 
Justice Thackray, authoring the unanimous 
appeal court judgment, sided with the Crown. In 
this case the officer disclosed in the second 
application that he had made a previous 
application for the search warrant before a JJP. 
The judge hearing the second application was not 
overruling the justice, but exercising his own 
discretion at a new hearing. Although an initial 
warrant refusal may influence a second justice’s 
opinion, the refusal does not govern that second 
opinion nor cause the second justice to sit in an 
appellate capacity. Moreover, this was not a case 
of “judge shopping”, abuse of process, or 
subversion of the judicial system.  
 
Justice Thackray also noted that there is no 
process of appeal or statutory right to review a 
rejected search warrant under s.11 of the CDSA. 
A judicial review by prerogative writ in the form 
of certiorari or mandamus could be sought in 
Supreme Court but these reviews are limited to 
jurisdictional issues and not errors of law. 
Sufficiency of search warrant grounds is not a 
jurisdictional matter and therefore would not 
give rise to a judicial review by prerogative writ. 
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The police were seeking an exercise of 
discretion and the court was afforded an 
opportunity to review an error of law within 
jurisdiction when the police made the second 
application for the warrant based on the same 
material.  
 
It also did not make any difference that a 
“justice” rejected the first application and a 
“judge” granted the second one. A “justice” is 
defined in the Criminal Code as “a justice of the 
peace or a provincial court judge.” Justice 
Thackray found both justices and judges had 
equal jurisdiction when issuing search warrants. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was 
ordered.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
POLICE NEED NOT ACCOUNT 
FOR EVERY MOMENT OF 
IMPAIRED CHRONOLOGY 
R. v. Vanderbruggen,  
(2006) Docket:C43848 (OntCA) 
 
The accused was stopped and 
arrested for impaired driving. 
Six minutes after arriving at the 
police station he was searched 
and placed in a cell. Forty six 
minutes later he was turned over to the 
breathalyser operator for testing and a breath 
test was taken four minutes later. At trial in the 
Ontario Court of Justice the arresting officer 
testified that she did not know exactly when the 
breathalyser technician entered the 
breathalyser room. She did however, inform the 
technician of her grounds for making the demand 
when he entered and then saw him “playing 
around with the equipment.”  The arresting 
officer then left the room, completed some 
paperwork, and did not see the technician engage 
in any other duties.  
 
The trial judge concluded the breath test was 
taken as soon as practicable because the 46 
minute delay between arrival at the station and 
the taking of the first sample was adequately 
explained. This delay was taken up waiting for 
the breathalyser technician, the search, 
informing the technician of the grounds, and 
preparing the breathalyser. The certificate of 
analysis was admissible and the accused was 
convicted of over 80mg%. An appeal to the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice was 
dismissed.  
 
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court 
of Appeal arguing the 46 minute delay was 
unexplained and therefore the Crown could not 
rely on the presumption of identity under 
s.258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code because the 
breath samples were not taken “as soon as 
practicable.” Justice Rosenberg, writing the 
unanimous Ontario Court of Appeal judgment, 
first explained the presumption the Crown 
sought to rely on: 
 
Section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code is 
part of the scheme to ease proof of the 
concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood 
for inter alia proving the “over 80” offence in 
s. 253(b).  Section 258(1)(c)(ii) provides that 
where the breath samples were taken “as soon 
as practicable after the time when the 
offence was alleged to have been committed 
and, in the case of the first sample, not later 
than two hours after that time, with an 
interval of at least fifteen minutes between 
the times when the samples were taken” then, 
provided certain other conditions are fulfilled, 
the prosecution may rely upon the presumption 
of identity.  This presumption simply deems 
the results of the breath tests to be proof of 
the accused’s blood alcohol level at the time of 
the offence in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary.  Thus, in this case, although the first 
test was not taken until more than one hour 
after the [accused] drove the vehicle, that 
test is deemed to show what his blood alcohol 
level was at that time of the driving. [para. 8] 
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In defining the meaning of “as soon as 
practicable”, he said: 
 
Decisions of this and other courts indicate 
that the phrase means nothing more than that 
the tests were taken within a reasonably 
prompt time under the circumstances…There 
is no requirement that the tests be taken as 
soon as possible.  The touchstone for 
determining whether the tests were taken as 
soon as practicable is whether the police acted 
reasonably…  
 
In deciding whether the tests were taken as 
soon as practicable, the trial judge should look 
at the whole chain of events bearing in mind 
that the Criminal Code permits an outside limit 
of two hours from the time of the offence to 
the taking of the first test.    The “as soon as 
practicable” requirement must be applied with 
reason.  In particular, while the Crown is 
obligated to demonstrate that—in all the 
circumstances—the breath samples were taken 
within a reasonably prompt time, there is no 
requirement that the Crown provide a detailed 
explanation of what occurred during every 
minute that the accused is in custody…[paras. 
12-13, references omitted] 
 
In this case, the Crown presented sufficient 
evidence from which a judge could conclude that 
the police acted reasonably and that the breath 
samples were taken as soon as practicable in all 
the circumstances.   “There was an approximate 
delay of one hour and fifteen minutes from the 
time of the offence to the taking of the first 
sample,” said Justice Rosenberg.  “The following 
evidence was offered as explanation for this 
delay:  time was taken in arresting the [accused], 
reading him his rights, transporting him to the 
station, waiting for the technician to arrive, 
searching the [accused], conveying the 
information as to the grounds for the breath 
demand and waiting for the technician to 
prepare the breathalyzer.”  In dismissing the 
appeal Justice Rosenberg concluded: 
 
[The Criminal Code presumption] provisions, 
which are designed to expedite trials and aid 
in proof of the suspect’s blood alcohol level, 
should not be interpreted so as to require an 
exact accounting of every moment in the 
chronology.  We are now far removed from the 
days when the breathalyser was first 
introduced into Canada and there may have 
been some suspicion and scepticism about its 
accuracy and value and about the science 
underlying the presumption of identity.  These 
provisions must be interpreted reasonably in a 
manner that is consistent with Parliament’s 
purpose in facilitating the use of this reliable 
evidence.  [para. 16] 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.ca 
 
CRIMESTOPPERS TIP PROVIDES 
IMPETUS FOR 
INVESTIGATION 
R. v. Jacobson, 
(2006) Docket:C43119 (OntCA) 
 
Police received a Crimestoppers 
tip from a caller who felt a 
suspect living at a residence 
may be cultivating marihuana. 
The address was provided and 
the house was described as having heavy blinds, 
newspapers, a vent in the garage, constant 
running water, and heavy lights. It was also 
reported that there was no activity during the 
day but people could be seen entering in the 
evening. The occupant of the house was 
described as a 25 year old white male.  
 
Police followed up the investigation and made 
several observations confirming much of the 
information. These included windows covered 
with heavy blinds or thick sheets and towels, 
condensation on all the windows, a vent attached 
to the garage, a roll of heavy clear plastic at the 
side of the house, and the accused’s vehicle in 
the driveway. Hydro records were also obtained 
and it was concluded that the hydro consumption 
at the residence was much higher than 
neighbouring homes.  
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A warrant was obtained and executed and the 
accused was convicted in the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice with producing marihuana and 
possession for the purpose of trafficking. 
Although she struck the references related to 
the hydro records from the information to 
obtain because of inaccuracy, the trial judge 
concluded that the tip (confirmed in part) and 
subsequent police investigation provided 
reasonable grounds upon which the warrant could 
be granted. The search was reasonable and 
therefore the evidence was admissible. She said: 
 
Even if the hydro information is excised from 
the affidavit, however, it seems to me that 
there are sufficient grounds upon which the 
justice could have issued the search warrant.  
In fact, in those common cases where the 
hydro has been bypassed, there is no hydro 
consumption data at all. 
 
It seems to me in this case that the 
corroborated tip, the observations over four 
weeks on five separate occasions that the 
front windows were covered with heavy blinds 
or towels; that there was condensation on the 
front windows; that there was no condensation 
on neighbouring houses even where there was a 
similar window; that there was a vent on the 
side of the garage, even if it was covered or 
not being used, is reliable evidence that might 
reasonably be believed on the basis upon which 
the authorization could have issued. 
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing the warrant was invalid and the 
evidence should have been excluded under 
s.24(2). Justice Rosenberg, authoring the 
unanimous appeal court judgment, agreed that 
the tip could not be used to form part of the 
grounds for the warrant; it was not compelling, 
the informer was not known to be credible, and 
police could only confirm some of the tip’s 
details.  
 
In discussing the compelling and corroborative 
nature of the tip Justice Rosenberg stated: 
 
The tip was not compelling for the following 
reasons. The informer only had a suspicion of 
illegal activity. It is significant that the 
informer describes his or her state of belief 
as follows:  “Caller feels a suspect living at 522 
Douglas Avenue may be cultivating 
marijuana.”…  There is nothing to indicate the 
informer’s means of knowledge; certainly there 
is no indication the informer has been inside 
the house and observed criminal activity.  
Rather, the informer was merely describing 
circumstances that anyone watching the house 
might observe.   And, it is not apparent that 
the informer had personally made the 
observations or was passing on an observation 
made by others. 
 
As to corroboration of the tip, the police were 
only able to confirm the broad outlines of 
information and some important information 
could not be confirmed.  For example, the 
police did not see the vent running 24 hours 
and did not hear water running all the time.  
[The officer] went to the house four times 
and he did not observe any of this.  Further, 
while the informer said there was no activity 
during the day and only activity late at night, 
the police did see some activity during the day 
(vehicles were present).  They did not go to 
the house at night.  Since the informer was 
not accurate about the daytime activity, I do 
not see how his or her nighttime observations 
could be relied upon. [paras. 17-18, emphasis in 
the original] 
 
Rather than forming part of the grounds for the 
warrant, the Crimestoppers tip was used as part 
of the narrative to explain why police launched 
their investigation. “The substantial grounds for 
the officer’s reasonable belief are the fruits of 
his own investigation,” said Justice Rosenberg.  
“These grounds, omitting the hydro information, 
can be distilled to: the heavy blinds and towels, 
the vent, the condensation that was not 
observed on any other house in the area 
indicating a large heat source, and the officer’s 
experience that a hydroponics marijuana 
operation requires lamps that produce large 
amounts of heat.” In holding that this was 
sufficient upon which a warrant could be issued, 
the Court stated: 
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Without the hydro information this was a 
close case.  However, the police officer’s 
observations, filtered through his experience 
with marijuana cultivation operations, provided 
sufficient information upon which the justice 
of the peace could have issued the warrant.  
The heavy blinds, the use of the towels, the 
condensation, and the vent all indicate the 
house and the garage contained a substantial 
heat source that the occupant was attempting 
to shield from view.  A reasonable inference, 
based on the officer’s experience, was that 
the house and garage were being used to grow 
marijuana.  While there could be other 
inferences, the officer’s investigation tended 
to dispel them.  For example, the fact that the 
blinds, sheet and towels were present for over 
a month tended to minimize the possibility 
that the homeowner was merely engaged in 
some temporary lawful activity such as 
painting the house or conducting an extensive 
fumigation operation.  There were no trades 
people’s vehicles present that might explain 
renovations that might have called for the 
coverings on the windows. It may be that the 
occupant was preoccupied with his privacy, but 
this would not explain the condensation or the 
vent in the attached garage.  The standard of 
reasonable grounds does not require proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt or even proof on a 
balance of probabilities.  If the inference of 
specific criminal activity is a reasonable 
inference from the facts, the warrant could 
be issued. [para. 22] 
 
The accused’s conviction appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.ca 
 
OFFICER NEED NOT KNOW 
‘SPECIFIC MODALITY’ OF 
CRIME 
R. v. Herman,  
(2006) Docket:C44168 (OntCA) 
 
During the accused’s trial in the 
Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice the arresting officer 
testified he believed the 
accused was involved in the offence of 
possessing stolen property, but conceded he did 
not know if the accused actually used or only 
attempted to use the stolen credit card. The 
trial judge ruled the officer did not understand 
the specific crime and found he therefore did 
not have reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused. The search that followed violated s.8 of 
the Charter and the evidence was excluded 
under s.24(2). 
 
The Crown’s appeal to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal was allowed. In a brief oral judgment, the 
Court ruled that the trial judge erred in finding 
that the officer did not have reasonable 
grounds. The trial judge imposed too high a 
standard on the arresting officer by requiring 
that he know the specific modality of the crime, 
especially since the arrest involved two suspects 
acting together.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.ca 
 
PROWLER’S MOTIVE 
IRRELEVANT FOR TRESPASS 
AT NIGHT CHARGE 
R. v. Priestap,  
(2006) Docket:C43808 (OntCA) 
 
Shortly after 9:00 pm the 
complainant went outside into 
her backyard to gather laundry 
when she noticed something 
hunched over by her deck. The shape moved in a 
crouched position into the front of her yard. She 
repeatedly asked “Who’s there”, and a male voice 
answered he was looking for something. After 
further questioning by the complainant, the man 
stood up and walked towards her, moved quickly 
by to the front of the house, and then ran away.  
 
The frightened complainant called 911 and the 
police arrested the accused when he returned to 
his car parked on the roadway near the 
complainant’s home. He admitted he was in the 
backyard and tried to provide a lawful excuse 
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that he was looking to expose a marihuana grow 
operation in the area. In the car police found a 
balaclava, duct tape, binoculars, flashlights, a 
tape recorder, a camera, and a telephone book.  
Several days later a pair of the complainant’s 
underwear was found in some bushes three doors 
away.  
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
accused was convicted of trespassing at night 
under s.177 of the Criminal Code. The trial judge 
rejected the accused’s excuse and concluded he 
had prowled by “‘stealthy traversing’ in the sense 
of furtive, secret or clandestine moving about 
someone’s property,” including crouching near 
the house. There was no need to prove intent to 
commit an evil act.  
 
The accused successfully appealed to the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The appeal 
judge quashed the accused’s conviction, holding 
the Crown needed to prove the accused not only 
prowled, but prowled with the intention to 
commit a specific evil act. The Crown then 
successfully appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing the appeal judge erred.  
 
Section 177 of the Criminal Code states that a 
person commits an offence if they, “without 
lawful excuse, the proof of which lies on [them], 
loiters or prowls at night on the property of 
another person near a dwelling-house situated on 
that property.” The movements in prowling itself 
suggest that the prowler is up to no good. It is 
not necessary for the Crown to prove the 
additional element of intent to commit another 
specific act for a conviction of prowling. Justice 
Lang, for the unanimous Ontario Court of Appeal, 
stated: 
  
The purpose of s.177 and its placement in the 
Code assist in interpreting Parliamentary 
intention. Section 177 was introduced to 
criminalize “peeping tom” conduct, conduct 
that the Supreme Court of Canada held was 
not a criminal offence…The s.177 trespassing 
at night offence is classified as a “Disorderly 
Conduct” offence under Part V of the Code, 
along with such offences as vagrancy, causing a 
disturbance, nudity and indecent acts. 
 
In enacting this section, Parliament specified 
that loitering or prowling would only be a 
criminal offence if committed at night near a 
dwelling house. It follows from this that, on a 
purposive interpretation of s. 177, Parliament 
did not intend to criminalize petty trespass, 
such as individuals entering on private 
property in the daytime in a manner that did 
not convey any malevolent purpose. Parliament, 
however, did intend to protect a resident by 
criminalizing the invasion of that person’s 
residential property at night in a surreptitious 
manner when the intruder has no lawful excuse 
to explain his presence. 
 
This makes sense. Instinctively, an occupant or 
other observer seeing a trespasser moving 
stealthily or furtively near a home at night, 
absent other explanation, would conclude that 
the trespasser’s conduct evidences an 
intention to avoid detection - perhaps because 
the trespasser has committed, or is going to 
commit, or is contemplating committing, a 
reprehensible act. Whatever the prowler’s 
motive, however, it is the act of prowling itself 
that is an unwarranted invasion that causes 
anxiety to the observer, and not any 
reprehensible act that the trespasser may 
intend to commit, may have committed, or is 
contemplating committing. 
 
The prowler’s purpose in prowling is not the 
focus of s. 177 because other provisions of the 
Code will likely address that purpose [such as 
attempts to commit crimes or possession of 
housebreaking instruments]. Moreover, 
inherent in prowling is the implication that the 
accused is up to no good. The accused is 
prosecuted under s. 177 only for prowling, and 
not for the underlying purpose of such 
activity.   
 
It is because the offence is prowling and not 
the contemplation of another specific crime, 
that Parliament explicitly placed the burden on 
the prowler to provide a lawful excuse for his 
or her conduct.  
 
I find further support for this interpretation 
from the structure of s. 177. It would be 
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illogical to reason that a prowler cannot be 
convicted unless the Crown proves the specific 
evil act intended by the prowler while, at the 
same time, loitering, a more innocuous activity, 
can lead to a conviction without proof of any 
additional specific intention. 
 
The [accused] raises an additional argument 
that an interpretation of “prowl” without an 
added element of a specific evil goal would 
criminalize the conduct of many innocent 
individuals. To support this argument he raises 
hypothetical situations including children 
playing hide and seek in a neighbour’s 
backyard, a teenager retrieving an errant 
Frisbee from a householder’s backyard, or a 
golfer seeking to retrieve a wayward golf ball 
from a house adjacent to a golf course.  These 
“innocent” activities, argues the [accused], 
could not have a “lawful” explanation because 
they offend against the Trespass to Property 
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.  T.21 (the TPA). 
 
With certain common sense exceptions, the 
TPA makes it an offence, and therefore 
unlawful, for a person to enter enclosed 
residential premises unless the person has the 
occupier’s permission. The onus of proving 
permission is on the intruder. 
 
To begin with, it is unlikely that such 
“innocent” activities would take place during 
the night or that such individuals would 
stealthily enter into a residential backyard in a 
surreptitious manner to seek lost equipment. 
“Night” is defined in s. 2 of the Code as “the 
period between nine o’clock in the afternoon 
and six o’clock in the forenoon of the following 
day” and “dwelling house” is defined as “the 
whole or any part of a building or structure 
that is kept or occupied as a permanent or 
temporary residence”. Applying those 
definitions to the hypotheticals raised by the 
[accused], it is unlikely that an “innocent” 
individual would prowl in a clearly demarcated 
residential backyard for such a purpose at 
night. Accordingly, in my view, this argument 
does not assist the [accused]. 
 
A plain reading of s. 177 leads to the 
conclusion that an accused commits an offence 
if he or she intentionally loiters or prowls at 
night near a residence on another person’s 
property unless the accused establishes a 
lawful excuse for his or her conduct. The 
Crown is not required to prove that the 
accused also had an intention to commit a 
specific evil act. [references omitted, paras. 
25-34,] 
 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and the accused’s 
conviction for prowling at night was restored. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.ca 
 
PRESUMPTIVE YOUTH 
SENTENCING REGIME 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
R. v. D.B.,  
(2006) Dockets:C42719/C42923 (OntCA) 
 
The accused, a young person 
under the Youth Criminal Justice 
Act (YCJA), plead guilty to 
manslaughter in the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice. Since 
manslaughter is a “presumptive offence” under 
s.2 of the YCJA, an adult sentence is required 
unless the youth applies for a youth sentence 
and satisfies the court that such a sentence is 
appropriate in the circumstances. The accused 
applied to be sentenced as a youth, but Crown 
opposed the application.  
 
The accused then challenged the 
constitutionality of the YCJA sentencing regime, 
including the need for a youth to prove that a 
youth sentence should be imposed rather than an 
adult sentence. The trial judge concluded that 
the presumptive sentencing provisions in the 
YCJA violated s.7 of the Charter. The Crown 
then brought an application to have the accused 
sentenced as an adult. The accused, however, 
was sentenced as a youth and given three years 
of intensive rehabilitative custody and 
supervision, 30 months committed to custody and 
the remainder served in the community.  
 
 Volume 6 Issue 4             www.10-8.ca 
July/August 2006 
11
The Crown appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge 
erred in determining the various YCJA 
sentencing provisions violated s.7 of the Charter 
and could not be saved by s.1.  
 
Section 7 states that “everyone has the right to 
life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice.” Justice Goudge, writing the decision of 
the court, found that the accused’s liberty 
interests were engaged by presumptive 
sentencing because young persons are exposed 
“to the harsher sentencing regime imposed on 
adults, rather than the youth sentencing 
regime.” For young persons committing a 
presumptive offence an adult sentence is the 
norm while a youth sentence is the exception.  
 
Having found the accused’s liberty interests 
engaged, the Court then examined whether any 
principles of fundamental justice applied. A 
“principle of fundamental justice” must be (1) a 
legal principle (not merely a policy matter), (2) 
vital or fundamental to society’s notion of 
justice, and (3) must be capable of being 
identified with precision and applied to 
situations in a manner that yields predictable 
results. In this appeal, the Court found there 
were at least two principles of fundamental 
justice in play; treating youths separately from 
adults and the burden of proof upon sentencing.  
 
Fundamental Justice Principle #1: 
Treating Youths Separately  
 
“It is a principle of fundamental justice that 
young offenders should be dealt with separately 
and not as adults in recognition of their reduced 
maturity,” said Justice Goudge. “Put another 
way, the system of criminal justice for young 
persons must be premised on treating them 
separately, and not as adults, because they are 
not yet adults.” This principle meets the criteria 
governing a principle of fundamental justice.  
 
Treating youths separately is clearly a legal 
principle because there has been a system of 
youth criminal justice distinct from adult justice 
for more than 100 years in Canada (Juvenile 
Delinquents Act: 1908, Young Offenders Act: 
1985, and Youth Criminal Justice Act: 2002). It 
is also fundamental to society’s notion of justice. 
The YCJA’s preamble as well as the 
International Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, of which Canada is a signatory, reflect its 
fundamental nature.  
 
Finally, “the principle is sufficiently precise to 
yield a manageable standard against which to 
measure deprivations of life, liberty or security 
of the person.” The norm is that the youth will 
presumptively be dealt with separately from 
adults in recognition of their reduced maturity. 
In individual cases, where it is shown that the 
youth should be dealt with as an adult, the 
principle will not be undercut.  
 
Fundamental Justice Principle #2: 
Sentencing Burden Proof  
 
The second principle of fundamental justice 
identified is that “the Crown must assume the 
burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable 
doubt that there are aggravating circumstances 
in the commission of the offence that warrant a 
more severe penalty” during the sentencing 
phase. What this simply means is that the Crown 
bears the onus of justifying why a more serious 
punishment is necessary, not the other way 
around. However, s.72 of the YCJA places the 
onus on the youth to prove that a youth 
sentence (less severe penalty) is sufficient, 
rather than the onus being placed on the Crown 
that an adult sentence (more severe penalty) is 
appropriate. Furthermore, even if the burden 
imposed by s.72 is one of persuasion, not proof, 
the principle is nonetheless violated. The Crown 
can still have the more serious penalty of an 
adult sentence without discharging any burden 
of persuasion.  
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As a consequence of these two impugned 
fundamental principles, Justice Goudge 
concluded that the presumptive sentencing 
provisions violated the accused’s s.7 Charter 
rights because they imposed on the young 
person the burden of satisfying the judge that 
they should get a youth sentence, rather than 
an adult sentence. Furthermore, the 
infringement could not be justified under the 
saving provisions of s.1. Although there are 
cases where the imposition of an adult sentence 
would be fit, these more serious outcomes are 
still available, but the onus should not be placed 
on the youth to escape them. If the onus is 
placed on the Crown to demonstrate why an 
adult sentence is appropriate, the objectives of 
accountability, public protection, and public 
confidence in the administration of justice can 
be achieved without violating the youth’s s.7 
rights. The Crown’s appeal on the 
constitutionality of the YCJA’s sentencing 
legislation was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.ca 
 
Editor’s note: 
 
In this case the Ontario Court of Appeal came to 
the opposite conclusion of R. v. K.D.T., 2006 
BCCA 60, where the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal upheld the youth sentencing regime (see 
Volume 6 Issue 2, p. 13 of this publication).  
 
KNOWLEDGE OF ACTUAL 
CRIME NOT NECESSARY FOR 
DETENTION 
R. v. Stewart & Holder,  
2006 BCPC 0664 
 
Two police officers patrolling a 
laneway of a high crime area at 
2:30 am saw two men up the 
block walking away from a 
building. Each man was carrying 
two cardboard boxes. There were no delivery 
trucks or other vehicles in the lane and the men 
were told to stop. The officers exited their car 
and noted the boxes were sealed with tape and 
had freezer condensation on them. The accused 
were told to place the boxes on the trunk of the 
police car so the officers could see their hands.  
 
A label on the box was for a restaurant located 
about 30 ft away. An officer touched the box, 
found it very cold, and noted the boxes were 
marked “shrimp” and “salmon.” The men were 
told to stay where they were while police 
determined where the boxes came from. They 
were told they were under arrest for break and 
enter and allowed to walk in the area of the 
police car, but were not searched nor 
handcuffed, nor asked for identification. One of 
the men said they found the boxes in a 
dumpster.  
 
An officer went to the restaurant and found it 
had been the target of a break and enter. The 
men were then taken into custody and 
subsequently charged with break and enter, 
theft under, and possession of stolen property.  
 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Provincial 
Court the accused argued they were subject to 
an arbitrary detention and unreasonable search 
and seizure and the evidence should be excluded 
under s.24(2) of the Charter. In determining 
whether the accused were arbitrarily detained, a 
two prong analysis was required. An investigative 
detention will not be arbitrary if the detaining 
officer has reasonable grounds to detain 
(articulable cause) and the detention is 
reasonably necessary in all the circumstances.  
 
In this case, Judge Watchuk found the officer’s 
grounds for the investigatory detention were as 
follows: 
 
1. The time, 2:30 a.m., when the businesses 
in the area were closed. 
2. The observation of two males walking 
away from the rear of a building with 
boxes in their hands. 
3. There were no vehicles or delivery 
vehicles in the area. 
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4. The males did not appear to be 
employees. 
5. The area is known to be a high property 
crime area. 
6. The boxes looked to be frozen.  They 
were sealed with clear tape and showed 
freezer condensation. 
7. The labels on the boxes were from a 
business in the area. 
8. The boxes were cold to the touch.  
 
In the judge’s view, these reasons met the 
requirement for reasonable grounds to detain; 
they formed a “constellation of discernible 
facts.” She said: 
 
In arriving at my conclusions, I have 
considered that there was no knowledge of the 
officers of the alarm at Moxie's Grill, nor of 
any report of a break and enter.  An 
investigative detention requires the 
constellation of reasonably discernible facts.  
It does not require police knowledge of an 
actual crime committed.  That factor is one of 
the circumstances which must be considered, 
but it is not on its own determinative. 
 
Furthermore, the detention was reasonably 
necessary in all of the circumstances. “The 
accused were not searched or handcuffed, nor 
was their identification requested,” said Judge 
Watchuk. “The duration was brief, 10 to 15 
minutes.” The accused were therefore not 
arbitrarily detained. 
 
As for the s.8 Charter breach application, the 
accused had no standing to argue their rights 
had been violated. Even though the boxes were in 
their possession, the property belonged to the 
restaurant, not the accused, and they therefore 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in them. The Court recognized that this was 
similar to a car thief caught driving a stolen car. 
Since the car thief has no interest in the 
vehicle, they cannot argue their s.8 rights were 
infringed.  
 
Even if the accused did have an expectation of 
privacy in the boxes, the search was not 
unreasonable. The information obtained from the 
boxes (labels and coldness) was in plain view. The 
evidence was admissible. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
JOINT POSSESSION BASED 
ON ALL CIRCUMSTANCES 
R. v. Jones, 2006 NSCA 50 
 
Police stopped a car after 
observing its occupants, the 
accused driver and young person 
passenger, wearing balaclavas. A 
police officer saw a plastic bag on the front 
passenger floor in plain view containing 18 tinfoil 
balls of crack cocaine valued at about $20 each. 
The accused was searched and police found a cell 
phone and cash, including four $20 bills. 
 
At his trial in Nova Scotia Provincial Court the 
accused was convicted of possessing cocaine for 
the purpose of trafficking. An expert testified 
that the evidence was consistent with a “dial-a-
dope” operation where traffickers use a car to 
deliver the drugs, disguises to conceal their 
identity, cell phones or pagers to communicate, a 
float to make change, and sometimes use young 
persons or prostitutes to make delivery to the 
purchaser. The trial judge concluded that the 
accused “had the requisite knowledge and control 
in that he was involved in a joint enterprise with 
his passenger to traffic cocaine.”  
 
The accused appealed to the Nova Scotia Court 
of Appeal arguing there was insufficient 
evidence to prove he was in possession. Justice 
Hamilton, writing the judgment for the Court, 
dismissed the accused’s appeal. In first 
examining the law regarding joint possession she 
stated: 
 
Where a person is charged with an offence 
involving possession of a prohibited drug the 
Crown bears the onus of establishing that the 
accused had knowledge of the presence of the 
drug and that the accused maintained some 
"measure of control" over the drug…These 
elements may be proved by objective, relevant 
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and admissible facts from which a rational 
inference may be drawn. 
……… 
With respect to joint possession, where a 
number of individuals are occupying a car 
containing drugs, the issue of knowledge and 
consent is often determined by the nature of 
the relationship and mutual activities of the 
occupants in relation to the car and its 
contents… 
 
Evidence indicating a joint enterprise with 
respect to the drugs permits a finding of 
consent on the part of those who do not have 
physical possession of the drugs…[references 
omitted, paras. 8-11] 
 
Rather than looking at all the circumstances 
together, the accused tried to explain away 
each factor by itself. This, according to Justice 
Hamilton, was the wrong approach. She held: 
 
In attempting to impeach the conclusion 
reached by the judge, the [accused] attacks 
each piece of evidence: the balaclavas, the cell 
phone, the money, [the accused’s] furtive 
glances at the car while being questioned by 
police submitting that taken separately they 
could be consistent with an innocent purpose 
and do not point to [the accused’s] 
"possession" of the drugs. 
 
This argument misses the point. It is the 
combination of all these factors which [the 
accused] says are benign, together with the 
expert testimony on the mechanics of a "dial-
a-dope" operation, that the judge was required 
to, and did, consider, that lead to the 
conclusion that [the accused] and his 
passenger were involved in a joint enterprise 
to traffic in cocaine. [paras. 12-13] 
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
‘IN SERVICE’ LEGAL ROAD      
TEST ANSWERS 
 
1. (b),    2. (c),    3. (a),    4. (d),    5. (c),    6. (b)  
 
COMPELLING, CREDIBLE & 
CORROBORATED TIP 
PROVIDES GROUNDS 
R. v. Deol, 2006 MBCA 39 
 
A police officer received 
information from a previously 
reliable and confidential 
informant, who was involved in 
the Canadian drug trade, that 
the accused was aboard Via Rail Train 2, Car 214, 
Room 2 and had left Vancouver destined for 
Sudbury. The informant explained the accused 
was a drug courier and currently in possession of 
two pieces of hand luggage containing 50 ounces 
of cocaine. Other details were provided such as 
a description of the accused, his record, and 
that he bought a one way ticket with cash. The 
officer contacted Via Rail and confirmed the 
accused purchased a one way ticket from 
Vancouver to Sudbury and was on Train 2, Car 
214, Room 2 (a one person sleeping unit). The 
officer was also told that the train would be 
stopping in Winnipeg for about an hour. The 
police obtained a warrant to search the 
accused’s sleeper room and any of his luggage. At 
the train station the police found one kilogram 
of cocaine in the accused’s duffle bag located in 
his room.  
 
At trial the judge found the warrant valid and 
convicted the accused for possession of cocaine 
for the purpose of trafficking, sentencing him to 
four years in prison. The accused appealed to the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that 
the information in support of the search warrant 
did not establish reasonable grounds largely 
because it did not disclose the informer’s source 
of knowledge.  
 
When a reviewing judge examines whether a 
search warrant could have been granted, they 
are not to substitute their own view for that of 
the authorizing judge. Rather, the reviewing 
judge simply determines whether a search 
warrant could have been issued based on the 
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“totality of the circumstances.” During a review, 
the onus is on the accused to establish on a 
balance of probabilities that the reasonable 
grounds threshold has not been met. In 
discussing the totality of the circumstances 
standard, Justice Hamilton stated: 
 
Where the "totality of the circumstances" 
includes information from informers, the 
heart of the analysis to be done by the 
reviewing judge is an assessment of reliability, 
both of the informer and of the tip. Where 
the alleged presence of reasonable and 
probable grounds depends largely upon 
information supplied by a confidential source, 
certain concerns must be addressed before 
concluding that the tip was reliable and that 
reasonable grounds have been established. 
[para. 9] 
 
This reliability assessment includes the 
following concerns: 
 
(1) was the tip compelling (including the 
degree of detail and the specificity of 
the tip) 
(2) was the source credible (including the 
informer’s past performance) 
(3) was the tip corroborated (including 
confirmation by other investigative 
sources) 
 
In this case the trial judge found that the 
information was compelling, from a credible 
source, and had been corroborated, even though 
the informer’s source of knowledge was not 
disclosed. As Justice Hamilton noted, “while 
information concerning the specific source of 
knowledge of the informer is desirable and can 
be key to the establishment of reasonable and 
probable grounds, it is not mandatory.” The trial 
judge in this case was entitled to conclude the 
tip was compelling on the basis of its specificity.  
 
In concluding the warrant was valid, Justice 
Hamilton wrote: 
 
When read as a whole, the judge's reasons 
demonstrate an understanding of the 
principles established… and a consideration of 
the facts to those principles. While the tip 
lacked specificity as to the informer's source 
of knowledge, on the basis of the compelling 
nature of the details of the tip, the reliability 
of the informer, and the extent of 
corroboration of material facts, the judge was 
entitled to conclude that the information in 
the affidavit "meets the criteria for a warrant 
and provide[s] reasonable and probable 
grounds for the exercise of the search 
warrant." His reasons demonstrate that he 
applied a higher threshold than the applicable 
test of whether the magistrate could have 
issued the search warrant. Obviously, 
therefore, the accused failed to demonstrate, 
on a balance of probabilities, that the warrant 
could not have issued. [para. 19] 
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
DOCK IDENTIFICATION NOT 
NECESSARY TO PROVE 
IDENTITY 
R. v. Bretti, 2006 NSCA 49 
 
After clocking an Ontario rental 
car speeding 141 km/h in a 110 
km/h zone, the driver and lone 
occupant of the vehicle was 
asked for his driver’s licence. He produced an 
Ontario photo driver’s licence in the name of 
“Brian Bretti.” A summary offence ticket was 
issued directing Bretti to appear in court.  
 
When the case was called in Nova Scotia 
Provincial Court a defence lawyer came forward 
and told the Court Bretti was present. However, 
the accused was not identified as the driver in 
Court by the officer. The accused was 
nonetheless convicted and his appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia was dismissed. He 
again appealed, this time to the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal, arguing the evidence was not 
sufficient to find identity had been established.   
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Justice Bateman, writing the Appeal Court’s 
decision, first noted that dock identification is 
not essential to proving identity. In dismissing 
the accused’s appeal, she stated: 
 
The accused here is Brian E. Bretti. The driver 
of the car identified himself as that person by 
providing a driver's license in that name when 
asked for his license. There was, therefore, no 
confusion on who was the accused before the 
court…. When the case was called in Provincial 
Court, Mr. Shatford came forward as defence 
counsel for the named accused and advised 
that "Mr. Bretti" was present. In the absence 
of a suggestion by Mr. Shatford that the Mr. 
Bretti in court that day had been mistaken for 
the accused Bretti and summonsed in error, it 
was reasonable for the judge to infer that the 
accused, Mr. Bretti, was the same Mr. Bretti 
in court and represented by Mr. Shatford that 
day…. Finally, there was uncontradicted 
evidence that the driver who when stopped by 
[the officer] and asked for "his" license, 
identified himself by Ontario photo driver's 
license as Brian E. Bretti. He was the lone 
occupant of an Ontario rental vehicle which 
was travelling substantially in excess of the 
posted speed limit. It was that person to whom 
[the officer] issued the summary offence 
ticket. The information that is on the summary 
offence ticket formed the subject matter or 
the charge before the court. The judge 
accepted [the officer’s] evidence. There was 
then evidence from which the judge could 
reasonably conclude that it was the accused, 
Bretti, and no other, who committed the crime 
charged. 
 
The [accused] says, as well, that the 
identification is faulty because [the officer] 
did not testify that he compared the likeness 
on the photo driver's license with the 
appearance of the driver. The exculpatory 
premise for this argument would be that the 
driver of the speeding car, who was not Mr. 
Bretti, was in possession of Mr. Bretti's photo 
driver's license and falsely identified himself 
to [the officer]. This suggestion was not put 
to [the officer] on cross-examination nor 
advanced to the Court on Mr. Bretti's behalf. 
The Crown had made out a prima facie case of 
identity. The requirement is proof of the 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, not proof 
beyond some fantastical possibility. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
CANINE SNIFF & SEARCH OF 
BACKPACK UNREASONABLE 
R. v. M.A.,  
(2006) Docket:C42056 (OntCA) 
 
A high school principal, 
concerned about the presence of 
drugs in his school, had offered 
a standing invitation for police to 
bring drug detector dogs into the school. Two 
years later, three police officers with a dog 
arrived at the school one morning and told the 
principal they wanted permission to go through 
the school, which was immediately granted. 
After students were instructed to remain in 
their classrooms, the police randomly searched 
the school.  
 
In a small gymnasium the dog alerted on a 
backpack lying unattended next to a wall. An 
officer looked through the contents of the 
backpack and found 10 bags of marihuana, 10 
“magic mushrooms”, a pipe, lighter, rolling 
papers, and a roach clip. As well, the accused 
youth’s wallet and identification were in the 
backpack. He was charged with possession of 
marihuana and psilocybin for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
judge concluded there were two searches: (1) 
the search using the drug dog and (2) the search 
of the backpack. He also found the search was 
not conducted by school authorities, but that 
the police conducted the search without 
reasonable grounds. Both searches, he held, were 
unreasonable. The trial judge also ruled the 
police search was disguised as a school search 
and even if it was a school search, there were no 
reasonable grounds to believe drugs would be 
found. The evidence was excluded under s.24(2). 
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The Crown appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the police were 
acting as agents of the school, that the dog sniff 
was not a search (but if it was it was 
reasonable), and that the backpack search was 
reasonable.  
 
Police Acting As Agents 
 
Justice Armstrong, authoring the unanimous 
judgement, ruled that the search was a police 
search. The police had not been requested by 
any school authority that day, had not given 
notice of their intention to search, and neither 
the principal nor any teacher played an active 
role in the search. “The fact that some two 
years earlier the school principal had issued a 
standing invitation to the police to search the 
school with the assistance of a sniffer dog does 
not, in my opinion, turn the search…into a search 
by school authorities in police uniforms,” said 
Justice Armstrong.  
 
The Search 
 
Justice Armstrong found it unnecessary to 
decide whether the dog sniff alone amounted to 
a search. Rather, he concluded the sniff and 
backpack search fell within the meaning of a 
search under s.8 of the Charter.  
 
Students have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the contents of their backpacks, much 
like an adult’s privacy in the contents of a 
briefcase. Students backpacks are not searched 
during the normal course of a school day nor do 
they expect their backpacks to be searched. The 
dog was a physical extension of its handler and 
was connected to the physical search of the 
backpack. Since the search was warrantless it 
was prima facie unreasonable and the Crown 
could not rebut this presumption. Further, the 
search was randomly conducted with the entire 
student body held in detention. Justice 
Armstrong wrote:  
 
To facilitate the search, the entire student 
population was detained in their classrooms for 
a period of one and a half to two hours.  
Although it was the principal who made the 
announcement to the student body to remain in 
the classrooms, it is my opinion that a review 
of the record indicates that he did so to 
accommodate the police search.  There was no 
credible information to suggest that a search 
was justified.  There were no reasonable 
grounds to detain the students…. “An officer 
cannot exercise the power to detain on a 
hunch, even a hunch borne of intuition gained 
by experience.”  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that 
there must be a clear nexus between the 
individual to be detained and a recent or on-
going criminal offence… 
 
Quite apart from the detention of the entire 
student body, of more significance is the 
unauthorized warrantless random search 
itself. 
 
In my view, the Crown has failed to rebut the 
presumption that the search was 
unreasonable.  Even if the presumption of 
unreasonableness did not apply, it is my opinion 
that there were no grounds upon which to 
justify a random search of the kind that was 
conducted in this case. [references omitted, 
paras. 57-60] 
 
The evidence was inadmissible and the appeal 
was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.ca 
 
VEHICLE SEARCH FOLLOWING 
PASSENGER’S ARREST OK 
R. v. Condon, 2006 BCCA 318 
 
Police received an anonymous 
tip of a drug deal about to take 
place. They were provided with 
a location, the names of two 
people involved, and reference was made to a red 
van. Police knew the names provided in the tip. 
One was a drug dealer who supplied cocaine to 
traffickers and lived in a lakeside cabin 
accessible only by boat; the other was having a 
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relationship with him. Both were on conditional 
sentence orders for possession for the purpose 
of trafficking and were not to have contact with 
each other.   
 
About 40 minutes after receiving the tip police 
arrived at the location—near a boat launch at a 
lake—and saw a red van belonging to a drug user. 
About 15 minutes later a black truck arrived and 
a boat was seen travelling across the lake 
towards the boat launch from the direction 
where the drug dealer named in the tip lived. 
When the boat arrived on shore, people were 
seen talking and hugging and the boat then 
headed back out onto the lake.  
 
Three people got into the red van while two 
entered the black truck. Both vehicles were 
stopped by police and the occupants arrested. 
The driver of the black truck had been arrested 
several months earlier for drug trafficking and 
the passenger, the accused, was a cocaine user 
and “mule”. The black truck was searched at the 
scene and two plastic baggies of cocaine and 
other drug paraphernalia were found. The truck 
was then towed to a police office, searched 
further, and more cocaine was found. 
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court on 
charges of cocaine possession and possession for 
the purpose of trafficking the judge found the 
accused’s arrest lawful but the vehicle search 
unreasonable. Although the tip was anonymous, it 
was compelling. It provided a specific date, time, 
location and names of the people involved in the 
drug transaction. The, search, however was not 
justified the judge ruled. The occupants were 
under arrest and could not destroy or tamper 
with evidence in the truck so a warrant should 
have been obtained. The evidence was excluded 
and the accused was acquitted, but the Crown 
appealed to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal.  
 
The Arrest 
 
The Crown submitted the trial judge was correct 
in concluding the arrest was lawful while the 
accused argued the tip was not specific enough 
and there was an insufficient connection 
between the tip and the black truck. The 
accused asserted that her arrest was premised 
on “guilt by association” and the police did not 
see any transfer of drugs between the people at 
the boat launch. At most, she contended, the 
police had enough for an investigative stop which 
would preclude a vehicle search for contraband.  
 
Justice Kirkpatrick, stating the opinion of the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, rejected the 
accused’s argument. “It is clear from the totality 
of the circumstances that there were both 
objective grounds for believing that a drug 
transaction had occurred and that the police had 
the requisite subjective belief that the persons 
observed at [the lake] were involved in the drug 
deal about which they had been informed,” she 
said. 
 
The Search 
 
As for the search, Justice Kirkpatrick found, it 
was lawful as an incident to arrest. A search 
incident to arrest may be undertaken for the 
purpose of protecting the police, protecting 
evidence, or discovering evidence. Although the 
police do not need reasonable grounds to conduct 
the search they do need an objectively valid 
reason related to the arrest. Vehicles, if in an 
arrestee’s immediate surroundings, may be 
included within the scope of a search incident to 
arrest. In this case, the search of the black 
truck was for the purpose of discovering 
evidence. In finding the search truly incidental 
to the accused’s arrest Justice Kirkpatrick said, 
“In my opinion, having regard to the details of 
the tip, the observations made at the…boat 
launch, and the police officers' independent 
knowledge of the individuals observed, there was 
more than a reasonable basis for [the] search of 
the truck.”  
 
The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, 
and a new trial ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
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ONLY ONE VALID PURPOSE IN 
MIND REQUIRED WHEN 
SEARCHING 
R. v. Caprara, 
(2006) Docket:C41856 (OntCA), 
 
The accused was stopped by 
police and provided a false 
name. He was arrested for 
failing to identify himself under 
Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act and for 
attempting to obstruct justice. The car he was 
driving belonged to his brother. Police said they 
searched the car looking for evidence of the 
accused’s true identity, but instead found drugs.  
 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
on four charges of possession of controlled 
substances for the purpose of trafficking the 
judge found the stop was made for legitimate 
road safety concerns. The arrest was lawful and 
the search was incident to the arrest. Further, 
the judge ruled, even if the search wasn’t for 
the purpose of finding identifying documents as 
the police testified, but rather to look for 
drugs, the search would nonetheless have been 
lawful as an incident to arrest because the police 
had reason to believe drugs might be found in 
the car. 
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the search for 
evidence of identity was a pretext for a drug 
search that they had no right to search for since 
he had not been arrested for any drug related 
offence. He also submitted that the search for 
identification evidence was unnecessary because 
the police already knew his identity before 
commencing the search. He further contended 
the police did not have a reasonable basis for 
thinking there might be identification evidence 
in the vehicle.  This, the accused argued, 
rendered the search a breach of his s.8 Charter 
right. 
 
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial 
judge’s analysis that the search for drugs was 
lawful as an incident to arrest: 
 
On the facts of this case, the police had no 
right to search for drugs as an incident of the 
[accused’s] arrest because the [accused] had 
not been arrested for a drug or drug related 
offence; he had been arrested for failing to 
identify himself and for attempting to 
obstruct justice by providing the police with a 
false name. Accordingly, any search for 
evidence incident to his arrest had to be 
restricted to evidence of identification; it 
could not spill over into a search for drugs… 
[para. 7]  
 
However, even if the police really had two 
purposes for searching the car (identity and 
drugs) as long as one purpose was proper as an 
incident to arrest the search was lawful. The 
search for identification evidence was 
reasonable. The police were not sure of the 
accused’s identity and “it was perfectly 
reasonable for them to think that there might 
be a wallet, a briefcase or perhaps a cardholder 
in the car containing evidence of the [accused’s] 
identity,” said the Court. “Furthermore, the 
area in which the drugs were found (around the 
floor mat underneath the armrest that 
separated the two front seats) was one where a 
wallet or cardholder could reasonably be 
expected to have been located.”  
 
The search for identification evidence was a 
valid search incident to arrest and did not 
violate the accused’s right to privacy protected 
by s.8. The appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Nothing makes a person more productive than 
the last minute-author unknown 
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PAT DOWN OF HANDCUFFED 
DETAINEE REASONABLE 
R. v. Duong, 2006 BCCA 325 
 
The police drove by a car 
parked in a high property crime 
area known for theft from 
autos and theft of autos and 
saw a man seated in the 
driver’s seat looking around inside the vehicle. 
Twenty minutes later the same vehicle was seen 
by the same officers parked at the same 
location but now the man was seated in the 
passenger’s seat looking out the window as if 
waiting for someone or something.  
 
The officer approached the car, showed his 
badge, and asked the accused if he had a driver’s 
license. The accused said “yeah” and made a 
quick movement under the driver’s seat and 
pulled out a wallet. The officer saw a car stereo 
in plain view with cut wires in the back of the 
car. When asked who owned the car the accused, 
in a slow and nervous fashion, said it was his 
“buddy’s.” When asked whose stereo it was, the 
accused’s eyes widened, his mouth dropped, and 
he again replied it was his “buddy’s.”   
 
The officer didn’t believe the accused and asked 
him out of the car.  He was placed under 
investigative detention for the possible stolen 
stereo. As he exited the car, the accused 
clenched his right hand and took an aggressive 
stance. Initially hesitant, the accused complied 
with the officer’s instruction to place his hands 
on the car. The officer asked him if he had any 
weapons or anything sharp on him. The accused 
responded “No” in a loud and angry voice. He was 
then handcuffed and patted down for weapons.  
 
As the accused’s midsection was patted down, he 
changed his position and moved closer towards 
the car. He was repositioned and the officer 
checked the accused’s right pocket after feeling 
a hard bulge which turned out to be a roll of 
money. It was left in his pocket. Another bulge 
on the accused’s right hip turned out to be a cell 
phone. The accused pushed his body against the 
car when the officer began to pat down his left 
side. The officer moved the accused away, 
continued the search, and felt a hard, solid 
object about 4” by 3” in his left front pocket. 
Thinking the object might be a knife used to cut 
stereo wires, the officer reached into the 
accused’s pocket and pulled out a white envelope 
containing 25 flaps of heroin and cocaine.  
 
At his trial on charges of possession of heroin 
and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking the 
judge concluded the officer had articulable 
cause to detain the accused for the investigation 
of a potential stolen stereo. The pat down search 
was proper as it was conducted for officer 
safety. There were no Charter breaches and the 
evidence was admissible. The accused then plead 
guilty to the charges, but appealed to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal arguing the detention 
was arbitrary and the search for officer safety 
was not reasonable.  
 
The Detention 
 
The accused contended that the trial judge only 
assessed the officer’s subjective belief without 
looking at the objective reasonableness of it. 
Justice Rowles, authoring the unanimous Appeal 
Court judgment, rejected this argument. 
Although the articulable cause standard requires 
both a subjective and objective element, the 
trial judge did consider both. The officer’s 
subjective belief that the car stereo might be 
stolen was not a hunch but was grounded in his 
observations and knowledge he had that provided 
the objective foundation for his belief.  
 
First, the officer saw a stereo with cut wires in 
the back of the car. His experience told him 
that car stereos are often stolen by pulling 
them out and cutting the wires.  “This 
observation, in and of itself, presented an 
immediate and objectively reasonable concern 
that a property crime had been committed,” 
said Justice Rowles.  
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Second, the officer “knew that the area in 
which these events were taking place had a high 
incidence of property crimes, specifically thefts 
from cars and stolen cars.” 
 
And finally, the accused’s “demeanour changed 
noticeably when answering questions.  His initial 
response about the driver’s license was ‘quick’.  
His subsequent responses about the ownership 
of the car and the stereo were ‘slow and 
nervous’.  His facial expression also changed.  
[The officer] was able to articulate his concerns 
regarding the change in [the accused’s] pattern 
of speech, facial expressions and demeanour in a 
way that the trial judge understood and 
accepted as reasonable.” 
 
Justice Rowles ruled the trial judge did not err 
in concluding the officer had articulable cause 
to detain the accused.  
 
The Search 
 
The accused also argued that the search was 
unreasonable because a brief investigative 
detention does not permit a search for evidence 
and any safety concern must be objectively 
verifiable, not merely premised on mere 
intuition, a hunch, or curiosity. He suggested 
there were no objectively discernible facts to 
support the officer’s safety concerns and that 
the pat down search was simply done to search 
for contraband.  
 
In summarizing the law on searches incident to 
investigative detention, Justice Rowles wrote: 
 
There is no dispute that police officers are 
entitled to take reasonable steps to minimize 
the risks they face in the performance of 
their duties…Where a police officer has 
reason to believe that his or her safety is at 
risk in the course of an investigative 
detention, the officer is authorized to conduct 
a protective pat-down search…A “frisk search” 
for weapons is a relatively brief and non-
intrusive procedure… Moreover, the 
reasonableness of a police officer’s decision to 
conduct a search for officer safety cannot be 
judged by a standard that would second-guess 
the officer’s actions with perfect 
hindsight…The “police perception of 
reasonable necessity depends very much on 
the particular circumstances in which the 
police officer finds himself”… [references 
omitted, para. 54] 
 
Here, the officer had bona fide safety concerns 
rendering the pat down search justified. It was 
entirely reasonable for the officer to infer the 
accused, the sole occupant of the car containing 
an apparently stolen stereo, might have a knife 
used to cut the car stereo wires. Only when the 
officer felt a hard object that could be a 
weapon did the search progress beyond a basic 
pat down.  
 
The fact the accused was handcuffed did not 
make the search unnecessary. Handcuffing does 
not necessarily eliminate officer safety 
concerns, either during the search or after the 
detainee is released. The officer thought that 
if the accused had a knife in his pocket he still 
might have been able to access it even with the 
handcuffs on. The search in this case was 
limited in scope and reasonably necessary to 
ensure the officer’s safety. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
‘HYPOTHETICAL’ PERSON 
ANALYSIS DOES NOT REBUT 
OVER 80mg% EVIDENCE 
R. v. Cave, 2006 NSCA 52 
 
The accused was stooped 
driving his motorcycle and 
provided two samples of his 
breath, both registering 
100mg%. He was charged with 
impaired driving and over 80mg%. At trial in 
Nova Scotia Provincial Court an expert 
toxicologist testified that the accused’s blood 
alcohol content straddled the legal limit based on 
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calculations using the absorption and elimination 
rates of an average person of the accused’s 
weight and drinking pattern. Based on these 
average rates, the expert concluded that the 
accused’s blood alcohol at the time of driving 
would have been somewhere between 32mg% and 
112mg%.  
 
The trial judge accepted the expert’s testimony 
as evidence under s.258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal 
Code tending to show  the accused’s blood 
alcohol level did not exceed 80mg%. Section 
258(1)(d.1) states that a reading over 80mg% is 
proof that blood alcohol concentration exceeds 
the statutory legal limit unless there is 
“evidence tending to show that the concentration 
of alcohol in the blood of the accused at the 
time when the offence was alleged to have been 
committed did not exceed eighty milligrams of 
alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood.” The 
accused was acquitted, but the Crown appealed 
the over 80mg% to the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal arguing the expert’s testimony was 
without foundation.  
 
Justice Fichaud, authoring the unanimous 
judgment, allowed the Crown’s appeal. The 
expert’s evidence was based on the statistical 
average absorption rates and not based on any 
tests performed on the accused. In rejecting 
the expert’s testimony as “evidence tending to 
show,” Justice Fichaud stated: 
 
[The expert’s] opinion was not based on any 
test of [the accused]. It was not based on [the 
accused’s] alcohol tolerance, or his rates of 
absorption and elimination. It was based on 
population averages, applied to a hypothetical 
individual of [the accused’s] weight who drank 
alcohol in the amounts and times stated by 
[the accused]. In my view, [expert’s] testimony 
is without foundation and cannot rebut the 
statutory presumption…[para. 15, reference 
omitted]  
 
A new trial was ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
DID YOU KNOW… 
 
…that as of February, 2006 
the RCMP was 23,466 strong, 
an increase of 905 over 2005.  
Personnel breakdown, including 
all ranks and civilians, was as 
follows2: 
 
 
 
 
EXPERT OPINION BASED ON 
POPULATION AVERAGES 
NOT EVIDENCE TO THE 
CONTRARY 
R. v. Gibson, 2006 NSCA 51 
 
The accused was stopped 
driving his all terrain vehicle on 
a highway and provided two 
samples of his breath, 
registering readings of 
120mg% and 100mg%. At trial in the Nova 
Scotia Provincial Court an expert in the 
                                                 
2 Source: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/html/organi_e.htm [July 9, 2006] 
3 Source: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/html/organi_e.htm [May 17, 2004] 
4 Source: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/html/organi_e.htm [December 23, 2005] 
 
Position 20043 20054 2006 Change 
2005-2006 
Commissioner 1 1 1 0 
Deputy Commissioner 5 7 7 0 
Assistant Commissioner 24 24 25 1 
Chief Superintendent 56 52 51 -1 
Superintendents 135 143 149 +6 
Inspectors 331 346 347 +1 
Corps Sergeant Major 1 1 1 0 
Sergeant Major 7 6 5 -1 
Staff Sergeant Major 1 5 5 0 
Staff Sergeants 704 742 780 +38 
Sergeants 1,568 1,616 1,666 +50 
Corporals 2,777 2,928 2,949 +21 
Constables 10,039 10,136 10,265 +129 
Other regular members 4 n/a n/a 0 
Special Constables n/a 82 76 -6 
Civilian Members 2,585 2,605 2,813 +208 
Public Servants 4,001 3,867 4,326 +459 
Total 22,239 22,561 23,466 +905 
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absorption and elimination of alcohol testified 
that the accused’s blood alcohol content 
straddled the legal limit based on calculations 
using the absorption and elimination rates of an 
average person of the accused’s weight and 
drinking pattern. Based on these average rates, 
the expert concluded that the accused’s blood 
alcohol at the time of driving would have been 
somewhere between 40mg% and 105mg%. 
 
The trial judge 
accepted the expert’s 
testimony as evidence 
tending to show  the 
accused’s blood alcohol 
level did not exceed 
80mg% under s.258 
(1)(d.1) of the Criminal 
Code. Section 258(1) 
(d.1) states that 
reading over 80mg% is 
proof that blood 
alcohol concentration 
exceeds the statutory 
legal limit unless there 
is “evidence tending to 
show that the 
concentration of 
alcohol in the blood of 
the accused at the 
time when the offence 
was alleged to have 
been committed did not exceed eighty milligrams 
of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood.” 
The accused was acquitted and the Crown’s 
appeal to the Nova Scotia Supreme Court was 
dismissed. The Crown then appealed to the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal.     
 
Justice Fichaud, authoring the unanimous 
judgment, allowed the Crown appeal. The 
expert’s evidence was based on statistical 
average absorption and elimination rates (general 
population) and not on any tests performed on 
the accused. In rejecting the expert’s testimony 
as “evidence tending to show,” Justice Fichaud 
stated: 
...An expert opinion, based only on average 
tendencies of the population instead of the 
accused's rates of alcohol absorption or 
elimination, is without foundation. As stated in 
Boucher, it is not "evidence to the contrary" 
under s. 258(1)(c). Neither, in my view, can it 
be "evidence tending to show" the accused's 
lower blood alcohol concentration under s. 
258(1)(d.1). [para. 19] 
 
The expert’s opinion was based on general 
population averages applied to a hypothetical 
person of the accused’s weight rather than his 
personal alcohol tolerance, absorption and 
elimination rates. The lower courts erred in law 
by ruling the expert’s evidence was a basis for 
the acquittal. A new trial was ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
FLIGHT & MANNER OF 
DRIVING HAD EXPLANATION 
OTHER THAN IMPAIRMENT 
R. v. Lannigan, 2006 PESCAD 10 
 
Police responded to a complaint 
that a male in a black pickup 
truck was looking for a fight on 
Main Street. The truck was 
spotted, the driver recognized, 
and officers attempted to stop him. The accused 
took off, driving dangerously and in a reckless 
manner eventually abandoning the vehicle and 
fleeing on foot. A police dog tracked the accused 
for 45 minutes to a residence located more than 
one kilometre away. The accused was lying on the 
couch in the house, his speech was slurred, eyes 
bloodshot and watery, and he had a strong smell 
of alcohol on his breath. His ability to walk, 
however, appeared normal.  
 
The accused was arrested for fleeing police, 
dangerous operation, and impaired driving. 
Breath samples were demanded but the accused 
subsequently refused to provide a sample. An 
additional charge of refusing a breath sample 
was added. At trial in Prince Edward Island 
s.258(1)(d.1) Criminal Code 
…where samples of the breath 
of the accused or a sample of 
the blood of the accused have 
been taken as described in 
paragraph (c) or (d) under the 
conditions described therein and 
the results of the analyses show 
a concentration of alcohol in 
blood exceeding eighty 
milligrams of alcohol in one 
hundred millilitres of blood, 
evidence of the result of the 
analyses is, in the absence of 
evidence tending to show that 
the concentration of alcohol in 
the blood of the accused at the 
time when the offence was 
alleged to have been committed 
did not exceed eighty milligrams 
of alcohol in one hundred 
millilitres of blood, proof that the 
concentration of alcohol in the 
blood of the accused at the time 
when the offence was alleged to 
have been committed exceeded 
eighty milligrams of alcohol in 
one hundred millilitres of blood. 
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Provincial Court the accused was convicted of all 
charges except for the refusal. In the trial 
judge’s view, the accused’s physical symptoms 
and manner of driving provided a basis for the 
impaired charge. However, she did not note that 
the symptoms were not observed until 45 
minutes after driving.  
 
An appeal by the accused to the Prince Edward 
Island Supreme Court was dismissed. The appeal 
court judge found the Crown’s case had been 
made out. The accused had drank at a bar, drove 
erratically, had indicia of impairment, and 
provided no explanation of what happened from 
the time of driving until his arrest. The accused 
then appealed the impaired driving conviction to 
the Prince Edward Island court of Appeal  
 
Chief Justice Mitchell  wrote the judgment for 
the Court. He first summarized the Crown’s onus 
in proving an impaired driving charge: 
 
In order to obtain a valid conviction on the 
charge under s. 253(a), the Crown had to 
adduce evidence sufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that at the time of driving 
the [accused’s] ability to operate a motor 
vehicle was impaired by alcohol. At no time was 
there an onus on the [accused] to adduce 
evidence to prove he was not impaired by 
alcohol at the time of driving. He was entitled 
to rely on his constitutional right to be 
presumed innocent. [para. 24] 
 
In this case, Chief Justice Mitchell found the 
facts did not provide proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the accused was impaired at the 
time he was driving. There was no evidence 
about what the accused had to drink at the bar.  
Even if he did drink alcohol that did not mean he 
was driving while his ability to do so was 
impaired by alcohol. “It is not an offence to 
drive after having consumed alcohol,” said Chief 
Justice Mitchell. “It is only an offence if the 
consumption results in some impairment of the 
ability to drive.” 
 
As for the accused’s manner of driving Chief 
Justice Mitchell stated: 
The manner of driving in this case is consistent 
with an explanation other than impairment by 
alcohol. The [Summary Conviction Appeal Court 
judge] seems to rely to some extent on the 
[accused's] flight and manner of driving as 
evidence of driving while his ability to do so 
was impaired by alcohol… However, in this case 
the fact that the [accused] fled from police 
cannot be used to infer that his ability to 
drive was impaired by alcohol at the time of 
driving. The flight is consistent with another 
explanation. It could have been a combination 
of trying to avoid the police after being 
involved in a fight and the road conditions at 
the time. It was in connection with his trying 
to start a fight that the police were called in 
the first place. Furthermore, the [accused] 
told [the witness] when he arrived at her home 
that he had been involved in a fight and that 
the police were looking for him. He did not say 
they were looking for him because he was 
driving while impaired. There was no evidence 
of improper driving until the police tried to 
stop the [accused]. The police officers did not 
testify there was anything wrong with his 
driving when they first spotted him. The 
dangerous driving began when they tried to 
stop him. [para. 28] 
 
Nor did the fact that the accused was impaired 
by alcohol forty-five minutes after he was 
driving provide a sufficient basis for concluding 
that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was 
impaired by alcohol at the time of driving. There 
was the possibility that he was not impaired 
when he first arrived at the house and only 
became impaired afterwards.  
 
The accused’s conviction was set aside and 
acquittal was entered.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Abe Lincoln was once asked, ‘What would you do 
if you had eight hours to cut down a tree?’ He 
replied, ‘I’d spend the first four hours 
sharpening the saw—Steven Covey 
